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Abstract 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a short measure 
of a person’s ability to resist intuitive response tendencies, 
and to produce a normative response which is based on 
effortful reasoning. The CRT correlates strongly with 
important real-life outcomes, such as time preferences, 
risk-taking, and rational thinking. Although the CRT is a 
very popular measure, there is virtually no available data 
about its psychometric properties. The present study 
aimed at investigating the psychometric properties of the 
CRT, and to verify the suitability of a longer version of 
the test, which was obtained by adding five new items to 
the three original ones. We applied Item Response Theory 
analyses. The two-parameter logistic model was used in 
order to estimate item parameters (difficulty and 
discrimination), and the Test Information Function was 
computed to assess the measurement precision of both the 
original and the longer versions of the test. The results 
confirmed the suitability of the original items for 
measuring the cognitive reflection ability trait. 
Furthermore, the results demonstrated that the longer 
version of the scale measures with high precision a wider 
range of the cognitive reflection latent trait.   
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Introduction 
 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is 
a short test measuring a person’s tendency to override an 
intuitively compelling response, and to engage in further 
reflection which can lead to a correct solution. As an 
example, consider the following item: A bat and a ball 
cost $1.10 in total.  The bat costs $1.00 more than the 
ball.  How much does the ball cost? ______ cents. 
Although the correct response is 5 cents, many 
participants give the response “10 cents”, which seems to 
pop into mind effortlessly. Indeed, a remarkable property 
of the CRT is that for each item, almost all participants 
produce either the normatively correct response, or the 
same incorrect (i.e., heuristic) response. That is, reasoning 
errors are very systematic.  
It has been proposed that because the typical heuristic 
response comes very quickly and easily (i.e., fluently) to 
mind, people will be highly confident that this answer is 
correct, and will be reluctant to revise it (cf. Thompson & 
Morsanyi, 2012). Indeed, in a subsequent study, De Neys, 
Rossi and Houdé (2013) found that people who gave the 
incorrect response to the bat and ball problem were 83% 
confident that their response was correct. Although this 
was significantly lower than the 93% confidence level 
reported by the participants who gave the correct 
response, this still demonstrates the attractiveness of the 
heuristic response. That is, to be able to produce a correct 
response, participants have to be able to effectively 
monitor and correct their impulsive response tendencies 
(cf., Frederick, 2005).  
Cognitive reflection was found to be negatively 
related to temporal discounting (i.e., the tendency to 
prefer smaller, immediately available rewards over larger 
rewards which will be available later), and positively 
related to choosing gambles with higher expected values 
(Frederick, 2005). Further studies showed that the CRT 
was also related to some typical heuristics and biases 
(e.g., Liberali, Reyna et al., 2012; Toplak, West & 
Stanovich, 2011, 2013), including tasks that contained no 
numerical information (such as syllogistic reasoning 
problems). Furthermore, although the CRT correlates with 
measures of intelligence and numeracy (e.g., Frederick, 
2005), it was found to explain additional variance in 
reasoning and decision-making tasks when it was 
administered together with measures of intelligence and 
numeracy (Liberali et al., 2012; Toplak et al., 2011). 
Other studies showed an association between the CRT 
and metacognitive skills (Mata, Ferreira & Sherman, 
2013), and people’s motivation to fully understand causal 
mechanisms (Fernbach, Sloman, Louis & Shube, 2013), 
and a negative association between the CRT and 
superstitious and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
2799
Seli, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012). Overall, these results 
demonstrate that the CRT is a very powerful predictor of 
a person’s ability to make unbiased judgments and 
rational decisions in a wide variety of contexts. However, 
as a consequence of the huge popularity of the CRT, the 
three original items have become extremely well-known. 
This obviously weakens the suitability of the original 
scale in measuring cognitive reflection, as participants 
might know the correct responses already. 
A further issue is the difficulty of the original items. 
Indeed, in his original publication, Frederick (2005) 
reported that in some university student samples, more 
than 50% of the respondents scored 0 on the test. Thus, 
the test might not be suitable for lower ability or less 
educated samples. Finally, with only three items, it is 
necessarily difficult to discriminate with high precision 
between people with different levels of cognitive 
reflection. 
Given these issues regarding the CRT, the aim of the 
present study was to develop some new items with similar 
characteristics to the original ones, in order to create a 
new version of the test, which is at least partially 
unknown to participants. In developing this longer version 
of the CRT, we started by investigating the psychometric 
properties of the original problems, since despite the 
widespread use of the CRT its psychometric properties 
are virtually unknown. In his original publication, 
Frederick (2005) did not report the reliability of the scale, 
and, with a few exceptions (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2013; 
Liberali et al., 2012; Weller et al., 2012), most researchers 
who used the scale followed the same practice. Very 
recently, Toplak, West & Stanovich (2013) also 
developed a longer version of the scale. However, this 
was based on a single study with a relatively small sample 
of participants (n=160), and the psychometric properties 
of the scale were not adequately tested. These authors also 
did not demonstrate that their participants mainly 
generated either the heuristic or the correct response when 
they responded to the new items. Finally, one of Toplak et 
al.’s proposed item was not open ended, but participants 
had to choose from three response options, which is 
different from the format used in the original CRT.  
In the present work, we applied Item Response Theory 
(IRT). We chose IRT since its application have potential 
benefits in testing and improving the accuracy of 
assessment instruments. Indeed, IRT models provide item 
parameters that enable the evaluation of how well an item 
performs in measuring the underlying construct. More 
specifically, IRT is a model that provides a linkage 
between item responses and the latent characteristic 
assessed by a scale. IRT assumes that each examinee 
responding to a test item possesses some amount of the 
underlying ability (denoted by the Greek letter theta). It is 
assumed that, whatever the ability, it can be measured on 
an arbitrary underlying ability scale having a midpoint of 
zero, a unit of measurement of one, and a range from 
negative infinity to positive infinity (practical 
considerations usually limit the range of values from,  say, 
-3 to +3). 
At each ability level, there will be a certain probability 
that an examinee will give a correct response to the item. 
This probability will be denoted by P( ). If one plotted 
P() as a function of ability, the result would be a smooth 
S-shaped curve (see Figure 1). This S-shaped curve, 
known as the Item Characteristic Curve (ICC), describes 
the probability of correct response to an item as a function 
of the possessed ability. This probability will be small for 
examinees with low ability and large for examinees with 
high ability. The probability of a correct response is near 
zero at the lowest levels of ability. It continues to increase 
up to the highest levels of ability, where the probability of 
producing a correct response approaches 1.  
Each item in a test will have its own item 
characteristic curve, depending on its specific properties. 
Thus, IRT attempts to model the relationship between an 
observed variable and the probability that the examinee 
will correctly respond to a particular test item. Although a 
number of different IRT models exist, the most commonly 
employed one is the two-parameter logistic model (2PL), 
which assumes a single underlying ability and two item 
parameters: a difficulty parameter (b) and a discrimination 
parameter (a). Measures of model fit and parameter 
estimates are obtained through maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Exemplar Theoretical Item Characteristic 
Curve for the Two-Parameter Logistic Item Response 
Theory Model (a = discrimination, b = difficulty). 
 
As we described above, IRT derives the probability of 
each response as a function of some item parameters. In 
the 2PL model, the first one is the difficulty (b) of the 
item. Under IRT, the difficulty of an item describes where 
the item functions along the trait, and it can be interpreted 
as a location index with regard to the trait being 
measured. For example, a less difficult item functions 
among the low-trait respondents and a more difficult item 
functions among the high-trait respondents. The second 
item property is discrimination (a), which describes how 
a 
b 
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well an item can differentiate between examinees with 
different levels of ability. The slope corresponds to item 
discrimination. It describes how rapidly the probabilities 
change in correspondence with changes in ability levels. 
This property is essentially reflected by the steepness of 
the item characteristic curve. The steeper the curve, the 
better the item can discriminate between levels of ability. 
The flatter the curve, the less the item is able to 
discriminate.  
Additionally, IRT makes it possible to assess the 
measurement precision of the test through the Test 
Information Function (TIF), which, instead of providing a 
single value (e.g., coefficient alpha) for reliability, 
evaluates the precision of the test at different levels of the 
measured construct (Embreston & Reise, 2000; 
Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991).  The 
information function is the expected value of the inverse 
of the error variances for each estimated value of the 
underlying construct [I(θ) ≈ 1/SE2(θ)]. This means that the 
more information provided by a test at a particular ability 
level, the smaller the errors associated with ability 
estimation. The Test Information curve shows graphically 
how well the construct is measured at different levels of 
the underlying construct continuum (i.e., a rather flat 
curve indicates that the test is discriminating within a 
broad range of ability; a peak means that the test is 
reliable in a narrow region of the latent trait distribution). 
In sum, in the present work, using IRT we analyzed 
the properties of the original CRT items and the 
possibility to obtain a longer scale with novel items that 
are unknown to participants, and, thus, it is not possible 
for them to retrieve the correct responses from memory. 
Additionally, we expected to obtain a longer scale which 
measures with high precision a wider range of the 
cognitive reflection ability trait. Finally, we studied the 
validity of both the original CRT scale and the new, 
longer scale. In particular, we expected that the longer 
scale would show similar correlations with various 
measures of intelligence, numeracy, and decision making 
as the original CRT. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 988 students (Mean age = 20.2 
years; SD = 1.8; 63% female; 76% Italian and 24% 
British) attending the senior year of high school (40%) 
and the first or second year of university (60%) at the 
School of Psychology and the School of Medicine in 
Florence (Italy) and Belfast (United Kingdom)1. All 
students participated on a voluntary basis. 
 
                                                        
1 Preliminarily, factor analyses were conducted separately on the 
Italian and English sample to check for equivalence. Results 
attested that the Italian and English version of the scale shared 
the same one-factor structure and similar patterns of factor 
loadings. This made it possible to merge the data to perform the 
subsequent unidimensional IRT analyses. 
Materials  
Cognitive Reflection Test - Long (CRT-L): The long 
version is composed of the three original items (Frederick, 
2005) and five new items. The development of this 8-item 
scale followed several iterations of testing, item 
elimination and modification, using different samples of 
participants. We started this process using a 10-item long 
version of the CRT, which included the three original 
items, three items developed by Shane Frederick 
(personal communication, July 2012), one additional item, 
based on Van Dooren, De Bock, Hessels, Janssens and 
Verschaffel (2005) and three items developed by us. 
During the item-development process, we took into 
consideration the fundamental attribute of the original 
CRT items: that the vast majority of participants either 
generate the correct response, or they generate a typical 
incorrect (i.e., heuristic) response. For this reason, two 
items developed by Frederick and the item developed by 
Van Dooren et al.’s, were modified in order to strengthen 
this item characteristic. For example, Frederick’s item “ If 
you flipped a fair coin 3 times, what is the probability that 
it would land “heads” at least once?”  was modified to 
“If you flipped a fair coin twice, what is the probability 
that it would land “heads” at least once?”.  In sum, the 
final version of our long CRT scale included the three 
original CRT items, one item developed by Frederick, two 
items, which were modified versions of items developed 
by Frederick, a modified version of Van Dooren et al.’s 
(2005) problem, and an additional item developed by us 
(for more details, see Primi, Morsanyi, Donati & Chiesi, 
submitted). 
Set I of the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM-Set 
I; Raven, 1962) is a measure of fluid intelligence, and it 
was used as a short form of the Raven’s Standard 
Progressive Matrices (SPM, Raven, 1941). Set I of the 
APM is composed of 12 items with increasing levels of 
difficulty, which cover the full range of difficulty of the 
items included in the SPM (Raven, 1962). Using IRT 
analysis procedures, the short form of the SPM has been 
found to have high reliability and validity (Chiesi, 
Ciancaleoni, Galli, & Primi, 2012). 
The Numeracy Scale (NS; Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 
2001) is composed of 11 items that assess basic 
probability and mathematical concepts including simple 
mathematical operations on risk magnitudes using 
percentages and proportions. A single composite score 
was computed based on the sum of correct responses. 
The Risk Seeking Behaviour Scale (RSB) was 
composed of 8 items adapted from Frederick (2005). For 
each item participants indicated their preference between 
a certain gain and some probability of a larger gain. A 
composite score was created by summing these 8 items. A 
higher score indicated a preference for risk in order to 
obtain a larger amount of money. 
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Procedure  
Participants individually completed the CRT scale in a 
self-administered format in the classroom. The average 
administration time was 15 minutes. A subsample 
(N=201) was also administered the APM-Set I, the NS, 
and the RSB. Total administration time for this subsample 
was one hour. For all these tests, answers were collected 
in a paper-and-pencil format. Each test was briefly 
introduced to the students and instructions for completion 
were given. 
 
Results 
As a preliminary step, item descriptives were calculated to 
check if participants, as expected, mostly generated either 
the correct or the typical heuristic response for each item 
(see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Percentages of correct and heuristic responses, 
standardized factor loadings, fit statistics, and parameters 
for each item of the CRT-L. 
Item 
% 
C(H) 
 S-2(df) p b (SE) a (SE) 
1 39 (48) .70 9.26 (6) .16 0.38 (.06) 1.73 (.16) 
2 45 (47) .75 7.12 (6) .31 0.18 (.05) 1.79 (.16) 
3 57 (34) .84 3.19 (5) .67 -0.20 (.04) 2.90 (.32) 
4 12 (69) .67 15.33 (5) .01 1.69 (.13) 1.67 (.20) 
5 83 (15) .74 6.92 (5) .23 -1.25 (.09) 2.00 (.24) 
6 56 (25) .49 12.87 (6) .04 -0.48 (.10) 0.83 (.10) 
7 39 (35) .76 5.00 (6) .54 0.39 (.06) 1.89 (.18) 
8 54 (33) .75 6.46 (6) .37 -0.09 (.05) 1.78 (.17) 
Note. % represents the percentage of correct (C) and 
heuristic (H) responses. Standardized factor loadings  are all 
significant at p = .001. Parameters were computed under the 2PL 
model (a = discrimination, b = difficulty). Due to the large 
sample size (N = 988)  was fixed at .01. 
 
Then, the factorial structure of the CRT-L was tested 
through categorical weighted least squares confirmatory 
factor analyses implemented in the Mplus software 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2004). The CFI and the TLI both 
equalled to .98, and the RMSEA was .05, indicating a 
good fit (Schermelleh-Engel & Moosbrugger, 2003). 
Factor loadings were all significant (p < .001), ranging 
from .49 to .84 (see Table 1). 
Having verified that a single continuous construct 
accounted for the covariation between item responses, 
unidimensional IRT analyses were performed. The 2PL 
model was tested in order to estimate the item difficulty 
and discrimination parameters. Parameters were estimated 
by employing the marginal maximum likelihood (MML) 
estimation method with the EM algorithm (Bock & 
Aitkin, 1981) implemented in the IRTPRO software (Cai, 
Thissen, & du Toit, 2011). In order to test the adequacy of 
the model, the fit of each item under the 2PL model was 
tested computing the S-χ2 statistics. Given that using 
larger samples results in a greater likelihood of significant 
chi-square differences, the critical value of .01 rather than 
the usual critical value of .05 was employed (Stone & 
Zhang, 2003). Each item had a non-significant S-χ2 value, 
indicating that all items fit under the 2PL model. 
Concerning the difficulty parameters (b), the original 
CRT items (1, 2 and 3) had medium level of difficulty 
from -.0.20  0.04 to 0.38  0.06 logit2 across the 
continuum of the latent trait and the new items  from -
.1.25  0.09 to 1.69  0.13. With regard to the 
discrimination parameters (a), following Baker’s (2001) 
criteria, the original CRT items, as well as four out of the 
five new items had high discriminative power (a values 
over 1.34). Only item 6 had a medium (a < 1.34) 
discriminative power (see Table 1).  
 
 
Figure 2. The ICCs of the CRT–L including the three 
original items (1,2 and 3) and the new items (4, 5, 6, 7, 
and 8) under the 2PL. Latent trait (Theta) is shown on the 
horizontal axis and the probability of correct responding 
is shown on the vertical axis. 
 
In Figure 2 the item characteristics curves provide 
visual information of the item characteristics. The original 
CRT items were located at medium level of the trait and 
had a high slope, indicating high discriminative power. 
Concerning the new items, item 4 was located in the 
positive range of the trait, so it was able to measure the 
higher level of the trait, while item 5 was located in the 
negative range, so it functioned better at lower levels of 
the trait. All the other items had a medium level of 
difficulty. The slope of the new items indicated their 
ability to distinguish between respondents with different 
levels of the trait around their location. 
 
 
                                                        
2 The logit is the logarithm of the odd, that is, the ratio between 
the probability of producing a correct response and the 
probability of responding incorrectly. 
2802
         
 
Figure 3.The Test Information Function of the CRT-L (left) and the Test Information Function including only the three original 
items (right) under the 2PL model. Latent trait (Theta) is shown on the horizontal axis, and the amount of information and the 
standard error yielded by the test at any trait level are shown on the vertical axis. 
 
Finally, in order to identify the level of ability that is 
accurately assessed by the scale, the Test Information 
Function (TIF) was analyzed. The TIF of the CRT-L 
showed that the scale was informative within the range of 
trait from -1.20 to 1.20 standard deviations around the mean 
(fixed by default to 0), and the amount of information was 
>4 indicating that the scale was sufficiently informative 
(see Figure 3). Taking into consideration only the original 
CRT items, the TIF showed that the scale was sufficiently 
informative for the middle level of the trait, within the 
range of trait from 0.50 to 0.50 standard deviations around 
the mean. Comparing the two TIFs it can be seen that the 
CRT-L’s curve has high information values associated with 
a larger range of the measured construct. Thus, the eight 
items of the CRT-L seem capable of differentiating from 
low-to-medium to medium-to-high levels of the latent trait, 
and, as such, the CRT-L allows for a better assessment of 
individual differences in the cognitive reflection construct 
than the original CRT. 
Concerning validity measures, Pearson product-moment 
correlations attested that all the investigated relationships 
were significant. Regarding intelligence, both CRT scales 
were positively correlated with the APM (see Table 2), 
which is in line with previous studies (Frederick, 2005; 
Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). Concerning numeracy, 
we obtained a positive correlation with both CRT measures, 
and values appear to be similar to the values reported in 
previous studies employing the CRT (Cokely & Kelly, 
2009; Liberali et al. 2011; Weller et al., 2013). 
Additionally, concerning decision making measures, 
Frederick (2005) observed that the original CRT was 
positively related to choices in risky choice tasks. That is, 
high CRT scores are related with more risky choices than 
low CRT scores. Our results are in line with this result 
confirming a positive correlation between risky behavior 
and the CRT tests.  
 
Table 2. Correlations of CRT and CRT-L with 
intelligence (APM), numeracy (NS), and risk taking (RSB). 
 CRT CRT-L 
APM .32** 
(N=201) 
.29** 
(N=201) 
NS .39** 
(N=201) 
.47** 
(N=201) 
RSB .18* 
(N=199) 
.16* 
(N=199) 
* p<.05; **  p<.01 
Discussion 
In this study we applied IRT analyses to verify the 
properties of a longer version of the CRT, obtained by 
adding five new items to the three original ones. Our 
analyses demonstrated that the new items had high 
discriminative power, similarly to the original CRT items. 
Moreover the five new items were more distributed along 
the ability scale, while the three original items were all 
around the mean. Thus, the TIFs showed that the new 
scale accurately measured a wider range of the cognitive 
reflection trait. In sum, these analyses confirmed the 
suitability of the original items in measuring cognitive 
reflection and also demonstrated that the new 8-item 
version of the scale had higher precision in measuring 
cognitive reflection than the original CRT. Concerning 
validity, the CRT-L showed similar correlations with 
various measures of intelligence, numeracy, and risk 
taking as the original CRT. 
In summary, the CRT-L has the advantage of 
including new items that participants are unfamiliar with 
and offers more precision in measuring the trait across a 
wider range of the measured construct. 
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